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New Findings on the Porter Hypothesis *
Paul Lanoie†, Michel Patry‡, Richard Lajeunesse§
Résumé / Abstract
Ce texte présente une analyse empirique de la relation entre l’ampleur de
la réglementation environnementale et la productivité totale des facteurs en
utilisant des données du secteur manufacturier québécois. Cet exercice nous
permet de pousser l’analyse de l’hypothèse porterienne dans trois directions.
Premièrement, l’introduction de variables réglementaires retardées nous permet de
mieux capter l’aspect dynamique de l’hypothèse. Deuxièmement, nous postulons
que l’hypothèse de Porter a plus de chance d'être valide dans les secteurs très
polluants. Troisièmement, nous postulons qu’il sera de même dans les secteurs
plus exposés à la concurrence extérieure. Nos résultats empiriques suggèrent que :
1) l’impact de la variable contemporaine de réglementation est négatif ; 2) le
résultat contraire est observé pour les variables de réglementation retardées et 3)
cet effet est plus fort dans les secteurs les plus exposés à la concurrence
extérieure.
This paper provides an empirical analysis of the relationship between the
stringency of environmental regulation and total factor productivity (TFP) growth
in the Quebec manufacturing sector. This allows us to investigate more fully the
Porter hypothesis in three directions. First, the dynamic aspect of the hypothesis
is captured through the use of lagged regulation variables. Second, we argue that
the hypothesis is more relevant for more polluting sectors. Third, we argue that
the hypothesis is more relevant for sectors which are more exposed to
international competition. Our empirical results suggest that: 1) the
contemporaneous impact of environmental regulation on productivity is negative,
2) the opposite result is observed with lagged regulation variables and 3) this
effect is stronger in a sub-group of industries which are more exposed to
international competition.
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11. Introduction
In two well-known essays (Porter, 1991 ; Porter and van der Linde, 1995), Michael Porter has
suggested that more severe environmental regulation may have a positive effect on firms’
performance by stimulating innovations. He actually argues that « properly designed
environmental regulation can trigger innovation that may partially or more than fully offset the
costs of complying with them » (1995, p.98). This is basically due to the fact that pollution is a
manifestation of economic waste, and involves unnecessary and incomplete utilization of
resources, which suggests that pollution reduction may improve the way firms use resources. In
this vein, he adds : « Reducing pollution is often coincident with improving the productivity with
which resources are used » (1995, p.98).
Of course, the so-called « Porter hypothesis » is controversial. Environmentalists and policy
makers tend to like such « win-win » solutions. However, its opponents (in particular, Palmer et
al., 1995) have raised severe arguments against it. Among them, one can point out : 1) the
empirical evidence supporting Porter’s view is anecdotal and cannot be generalized ; 2) there are
no « low-hanging fruits » : in standard neoclassical models, firms are perfectly rational and never
fail to implement a profit maximizing strategy, they do not need the regulator to help them in
doing so; and 3) rigorous studies that have investigated the relationship between environmental
regulation and productivity (a proxy for performance) have found that it was negative (see Jaffe
et al., 1996, for a review).
More systematic analysis of Porter’s hypothesis is needed before policy makers can base
intervention on it. We argue that existing empirical analyses related to the hypothesis can be
extended in three directions. First, the Porter hypothesis is dynamic ; it thus involves that
environmental regulation adopted today will affect firms’ productivity and performance a few
years down the road when the innovation process has been completed. Systematic studies of the
relationship between regulation and productivity have only looked at the contemporaneous
impact of regulation. Actually, Jaffe and Palmer (1997), who provide an empirical test related to
the Porter hypothesis by examining the relationship between pollution control expenditures and
measures of innovative activities, have taken steps in the direction we suggest. Indeed, they look
at the impact of lagged compliance expenditures on innovation1. Second, Porter’s arguments
suggest that firms with a high load of polluting emissions will have more opportunities to
identify and eliminate inefficiencies, so that the positive effect of regulation on performance
should be more important for firms that are initially more polluting. Third, Porter’s arguments
suggest that firms in industries that are more exposed to competition from abroad are more likely
to have an incentive to innovate to reduce costs than firms in less exposed sectors (Reinhardt,
2000).
This paper provides an empirical analysis of the total factor productivity (TFP) growth in the
Quebec manufacturing sectors that allows us to investigate more fully the Porter hypothesis in
the three directions we just mentioned; that is, we consider the impact of a lagged regulation
                                                     
1. They find that the impact of compliance expenditures depends on the measure of innovation that they use.
2variable on productivity and we investigate separately what is happening in the most polluting
sectors and in those that are more exposed to competition. The rest of the paper is organized as
follows. The next section presents our model and data. Section 3 discusses our empirical results
which show that : 1) the contemporaneous impact of environmental regulation on productivity is
negative, 2) the opposite result is observed with lagged regulation variables; and 3) this effect is
stronger in a sub-group of industries which are more exposed to international competition.
Section 4 provides some concluding remarks.
2. Empirical Model And Data
As in most of the literature, we measure total factor productivity growth by the Törnqvist index :
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The subscripts i and t refer to industries and time periods, and the j refers to inputs. The α’s are
the inputs’cost shares2.
A host of factors account for observed variations in PFT   (Denny et al., 1981, Gray, 1987,
Dufour et al., 1998) : changes in the scale of production, technological shocks, fluctuations in the
rate of use of quasi-fixed inputs, non-marginal cost pricing, and regulatory shocks.
In the following analysis, we define an equation relating the rate of growth of TFP to an indicator
of the importance of environmental regulation and to a series of control variables3 :
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where eit is an error term.
As in previous papers, the stringency of environmental regulation is proxied by a variable,
ENVIRONMENTit, which is the change in the ratio of the value of investment in pollution-
control equipment to the total cost in industry i at time t. As in most preceding studies, we
include a contemporaneous measure, but also a one-year, a two-year and a three-year lag to
                                                     
2. Output is measured by the value (in real terms) of industry shipments. Five inputs are considered : production
workers, nonproduction workers, nonenergy materials, energy and capital. The latter is calculated as the cost of
capital times the stock, and the different fiscal treatment of capital relatively to the other inputs is taken into account.
More details on the computation of the PFT   are given in Dufour et al. (1998), and Dufour (1992).
3. Note that, given the nature of our dependent variable, all the independent variables (except of course the fixed
effects) are expressed in first difference.
3capture the dynamics of the Porter hypothesis4. This procedure to capture dynamic effects is
suggested by Greene (1997). As in Jaffe and Palmer (1997), we also consider three moving
average of the prior years (see the definition in Table 1). We thus expect the contemporaneous
impact to be negative, but the converse result could be observed with the different lagged
variables. Furthermore, as discussed in the introduction, we expect this pattern to be stronger in
the most polluting industries and in the industries that are more exposed to external competition.
Therefore, we will capture these effects with crossed-terms involving dummies to separate the
sample between the more polluting (POLL) and the less polluting (LESS POLL)5 sectors, as well
as between the sectors which are more exposed to competition (COMP), and those which are less
exposed (LESS COMP)6.
As in Gray (1987) and Dufour et al. (1998), we also include a variable, OSHit, capturing the
stringency of the occupational safety and health regulation, one of the other important areas in
which firms are regulated. However, Porter’s argument is certainly less relevant in this field – it
can hardly be argued that workplace accidents are a physical manifestation of economic waste !
Hence, we do not introduce lagged variables in this case. Our measure accounts for five different
types of interventions in OSH : inspections, fines, applications of the right to refuse a dangerous
task, application of the right to protective reassignment, and requirement for a prevention
program7.
SCALEit, defined as the change in the level of output, is included in the estimated equation to
capture the effect of economies of scale on productivity. We expect the coefficient on this
variable to take a positive sign if economies of scale lead to an increase in productivity growth8.
It is also necessary to control for cyclical fluctuations in the presence of quasi-fixed inputs. For
instance, a temporary plant closing will drastically reduce a firm’s productivity level since no
output is produced, while the capital stock (or other fixed inputs) still has to be counted as an
input. Therefore, the variable CYCLEit, defined as the change in the capacity utilization index, is
included on the right-hand-side of the equation. It is expected to take a positive sign.
Industry specific effects are captured by the use of industry dummy variables, µi. These capture,
for instance, the absence of marginal cost pricing. The omitted fixed influences that vary across
                                                     
4. Beyond a three-year lag, we would face a problem of degrees of freedom.
5. The sectors considered in our analysis are : Clothing, food and beverage, leather, machinery, textiles, electrical
and electronic products, furnitures and fixture, wood, printing and publishing, metal fabricating, rubber and plastics,
transportation equipment, petroleum and coal products, primary metals, non-metallic minerals, paper and allied
products, and chemicals. The sectors were presented from the less polluting to the most polluting following a
classification of Environment Canada (1994) based on the emissions of regulated pollutants. The most polluting
sectors are the last ten sectors.
6. Our measure of exposure to outside competition is standard: (exports  +  imports  /  total shipments). Our most
exposed sectors are: 1) Leather; 2) paper and allied products; 3) primary metals; 4) machinery; 5) transportation
equipment; 6) electrical and electronic products and 7) chemicals.
7. Our measure is a summation of the five interventions. More details are provided in Lanoie (1992) and in Dufour
et al. (1998).
8. One could argue that this variable is potentially endogenous. A Hausman test (using SCALEit-1 as an
instrument) did reject the hypothesis of exogeneity. We thus report results of estimations in which SCALEit has been
instrumented.
4time but not across industries, ϕt, will be captured by time dummies. In particular, the latter may
capture technological progress.
For estimation purposes, pooled time-series and cross-section data are used. The data are annual
and cover 17 sectors in the Quebec manufacturing industry for the period 1985-1994 inclusively.
The mean and standard deviation of the variables are presented in Table 1. The data were
available mostly from Statistic Canada, Environment Canada and from the Commission de la
santé et de la sécurité du travail (the Quebec Board responsible for OSH).
3. Empirical Results
The estimations are performed using a generalized least-squares (GLS) procedure based on the
cross-sectionally heteroskedastic and time-wise autoregressive model presented in Kmenta
(1986, pp. 616-685). Table 1 presents three series of estimates, one without any subgroups of
sectors, one including cross terms distinguishing the impact on sectors that are more or less
polluting, and one including cross terms distinguishing the impact on sectors that are more or
less exposed to competition. In each series, we present one specification including the
ENVIRONMENT variable itself (and its lags) and another using moving averages.
In the first series of estimates without cross terms, the anticipated pattern of effects is observable:
The coefficient of the contemporaneous ENVIRONMENT variable is negative and significant,
as in the rest of the literature. As in Gray (1987), let us define the short-run contribution of
independent variable “x” on the instantaneous rate of growth of productivity as the product of x's
estimated coefficient and x's sample mean. This gives, for changes in environmental norms (our
variable ENVIRONMENT), and for our first estimated equation, a value of -0.0007, which
represents roughly 14 % of the (mean) observed decline in PFT   (our dependent variable). Now,
the long-run impact of a one-shot change in ENVIRONMENT can be approximated as the sum
of the contemporaneous and lagged coefficients on ENVIRONMENT9. We observe that the
variable ENVIRONMENT lagged one year is positive but not significant, while the variables
lagged two and three years are positive and significant. Again, for our first estimating equation,
the computed long-run impact of ENVIRONMENT can be approximated at 4.335 and the long-
run contribution can be estimated at 0.001, which is positive, and which represents roughly 24 %
of the observed change in PFT  . Hence, reinforcing environmental regulation at first reduces
TFP growth, then over a four-year cycle, it leads to an increase in TFP growth – thus confirming
Porter's conjecture.
                                                     
9. See Greene (1997:512) for a discussion of short and long-run impact multipliers.
5Independant variable
Lags Moving Average Lags
Moving 
Average a
Lags Moving Average Lags Moving Average
Environnementi,t
-2,629***       
(0,507)
-2.629***      
(0.507)
Environnementi,t-1
0,412          
(0,622)
-2.855***      
(0.562)
Environnementi,t-2
0,645E-04 
(0,258E-02)
0.488E-04  
(0.129E-02)
3,267***        
(0,647)
-0.378E-01    
(1.211)
Environnementi,t-3
0,546E-04 
(0,255E-02)
0.508E-04  
(0.817E-03)
3,286***        
(0,607)
9.859***      
(1.788)
Environnementi,t*Poll
-22,597***      
(7,712)
-22.597***     
(7.491)
Environnementi,t*Less Poll
-2,548***       
(0,492)
-2.548***      
(0.4896)
Environnementi,t-1*Poll
-32,681***      
(8,473)
-46.396***     
(10.079)
Environnementi,t-1*Less Poll
0,634          
(0,585)
-2.740***      
(0.533)
Environnementi,t-2*Poll
0,233E-05 
(0,171E-03)
-0.112E-05   
(0.119E-03)
13,715         
(10,459)
49.527***      
(20.962)
Environnementi,t-2*Less Poll
0,622E-04 
(0,257E-02)
0.499E-04 
(0.129E-02)
3,374***        
(0,632)
0.287         
(1.193)
Environnementi,t-3*Poll
0,101E-04 
(0,192E-03)
0.262E-05 
(0.978E-04)
-11,048         
(13,017)
-33.144        
(35.408)
Environnementi,t-3*Less Poll
0,445E-04 
(0,254E-02)
0.481E-04  
(0.809E-03)
3,231***        
(0,625)
    9.692***     
(1.852)
Environnementi,t*Comp -2,550***       (0,494)
-2.550***         
(0.493)
Environnementi,t*Less Comp -1,387         (10,153)
 -1.387          
(10.020)
Environnementi,t-1*Comp 0,504         (0,607)
-2.736***         
(0.551)
Environnementi,t-1*Less Comp -9,321         (12,382)
-29.307          
(19.879)
Environnementi,t-2*Comp 0,58895E-04 (0,257E-02)
0.493E-04  
(0.129E-02)
3,240***       
(0,669)
0.9282E-01      
(1.238)
Environnementi,t-2*Less Poll
0,565E-05 
(0,177E-03)
-0.482E-06  
(0.131E-03)
19,987        
(14,182)
51.849          
(32.239)
Environnementi,t-3*Comp 0,503E-04 (0,254E-02)
0.49638E-04 
(0.808E-03)
3,194***       
(0,626)
 9.581***         
(1.856)
Environnementi,t-3*Less Comp 0,434E-05 (0,169E-03)
0.112E-05  
(0.113E-03)
-5,938         
(16,125)
-17.813          
(42.210)
OSHi,t -0,941E-04     (0,787E-04)
-0.941E-04    
(0.788E-04)
-0,10E-04       
(0,78E-04)
-0.100E-03     
(0.785E-04)
-0,777E-04     
(0,786E-04)
-0.777E-04       
(0.795E-04)
Cyclei,t 0,607E-02***    (0,517E-03)
0.607E-02 ***  
(0.5186E-03)
0,619E-02***    
(0,49E-03)
0.619E-02***   
(0.4905E-03)
0,594E-02***   
(0,529E-03)
   0.5941E-02***   
(0.529E-03)
Scalei,t 0,164E-06***    (0,987E-08)
0.164E-06***   
(0.988E-08)
0,168E-06***    
(0,859E-08)
0.169E-06***   
(0.861E-08)
0,166E-06***   
(0,944E-08)
   0.169E-06***    
0.947E-08
Constant 0,192E-01***    (0,527E-02)
0.192E-01***   
(0.527E-02)
0,239E-01***    
(0,604E-02)
0.239E-01***   
(0.609E-02)
0,179E-01***   
(0,598E-02)
0.179E-01***     
(0.596E-02)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R² adj 0.8503 0.8503 0.8524 0.8524 0.8462 0.8462
Nb. of observations 102 102 102 102 102 102 102 102
* sig. at 10%, ** sig. at 5%, *** sig. at 1%
a
 MA-Environnementi,t-s = [Environnementi,t-1 + Environnementi,t-2 + … + Environnementi,t-s]/s
0,397E-04               
(0,253E-02)
-0,662E-05              
(0,187E-03)
25546                  
(0,343E+06)
0,250E-03               
(0,333E-02)
4,4104                  
(18,597)
-0,10063                
(4,2200)
0,809E-05               
(0,174E-03)
0,242E-03               
(0,332E-02)
0,249E-03               
(0,332E-02)
0,166E-05               
-(0,194E-03)
-0,459E-05              
(0,171E-03)
0,377E-04               
(0,253E-02)
Table 1
Coefficient (standard errors)
Mean (Standard deviation) Exposed to competition / Less 
exposedPolluting / Less PollutingWithout Subgroups
0,331E-04               
(0,253E-02)
6The results using the moving averages are similar and lead to identical short-run and long-run
estimated contributions of ENVIRONMENT on PFT  . Three differences are worth mentioning :
a) the variable lagged one year is now negative and significant; b) the two-year lagged variable is
not different from zero; c) and the three-year lagged variable has a very strong and statistically
positive impact. Hence, only the intertemporal patterns differ. Therefore, once again, the
following pattern emerges: reinforcing environmental norms reduces PFT   in the front year, but
over a four-year window, it appears to stimulate it.
In the series of estimates where there are cross-terms involving subgroups of sectors that are
more or less polluting, the pattern is present but less clear. In both series of estimates, the impact
of the contemporaneous and the one year lag ENVIRONMENT variable is negative and
significant for both subgroups10. However, the impact is much stronger in the subgroup of the
more polluting sectors. The impact becomes positive in both series for both subgroups when the
two year lag ENVIRONMENT variable is used. It is significant for the less polluting sectors in
the first series and significant for the more polluting sectors in the second series (with moving
averages). With the three year lag ENVIRONMENT variable, the impact is positive and
significant for the less polluting sectors, while it becomes negative but not significant for the
more polluting sector. The results observed with the moving averaged variables are similar. The
short run (contemporaneous) contribution of ENVIRONMENT for pollution-intensive sectors is
estimated at -0.005 (roughly one half of a percentage point of PFT  ), and the long-run
contribution at -0.013, which is substantial (it corresponds to three times the observed annual
PFT  ). For less polluting industries, the comparable contribution figures are -0.006 (short-term)
and 0.001 (long-term). Therefore, the pattern observed previously of strong and negative short-
term effects and more “positive” long term effects is replicated here, but only for the less
polluting industries.
Turning to the series of estimates where we distinguish between sectors which are more or less
exposed to competition, we find again the original pattern. In both series of estimates, the impact
of the contemporaneous and the one-year lag ENVIRONMENT variable is negative and
significant for the subgroup of sectors which are more exposed to competition, and negative but
not significant in the other subgroup. The impact becomes positive in both series for both
subgroups when the two year lag ENVIRONMENT variable is used. It is significant for the
sectors that are more exposed to competition in the first series of estimate, but not in the second
series (with moving averages). With the three-year lagged ENVIRONMENT variable, the impact
is positive and significant for the sectors that are more exposed to competition (in both series),
and not significant in the other subgroup. As an indication, the long-term contribution of
ENVIRONMENT is estimated at 0.001 (or 24 % of average PFT  ) for the exposed to
competition sectors and at 0.0008 for the less exposed to competition sectors.
                                                     
10. Note that, when we do not use moving averages, the impact of the one year lag ENVIRONMENT variable is
not significant for the less polluting sectors.
7Regarding the OSH measure, the impact is always small, negative and not significant. This
contrasts with results presented in Dufour et al. (1998) and in Gray (1987), which showed a
negative and significant effect. As for the SCALE and CYCLE coefficient, these are significant
and correctly signed. The estimated contribution of SCALE is 0.004 and that of CYCLE is
0.0006. This suggests that economies of scale are important in explaining observed PFT  :
changes in shipments have added half a percentage point yearly to PFT  . By comparison, the
autonomous (technological change based) growth of TFP can be estimated at about 0.02 (the
estimated intercept value).
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we have extended in three different directions the existing empirical analyses
related to the Porter hypothesis which suggests that more severe environmental regulation may
have a positive effect on firms’ performance by stimulating innovation. First, using productivity
as a proxy for performance, we allowed for the dynamic aspect of the Porter hypothesis to be
tested by examining the impact of environmental regulation adopted in a given year on
productivity a few years later when the innovation process has been completed. Second, Porter’s
arguments suggest that firms with a high load of polluting emissions will have more
opportunities to identify and eliminate inefficiencies, so that the positive effect of regulation on
performance could be more important in firms that are initially more polluting. We have tested
this by distinguishing the impact of environmental regulation on productivity between sectors
that are more polluting and sectors that are less polluting. Third, Porter’s arguments suggest that
firms in industries that are more exposed to competition from abroad are more likely to have an
incentive to innovate to reduce costs than firms in less exposed sectors. This was also tested by
examining the effect of regulation in two different subgroups of sectors, those that are more
exposed to external competition and those that are less.
Our analysis showed that, when one allows dynamic effects to occur, the impact of
environmental regulation on productivity could become less detrimental and even positive,
confirming the Porter hypothesis. This pattern was seen clearly in our results when we used our
whole sample. It seemed also that sectors which are more exposed to competition are more likely
to behave in a fashion that confirms the hypothesis than sectors which are less exposed. When
distinguishing between more and less polluting industries, and contrary to our conjecture,
Porter's hypothesis is confirmed only for the second group of industries. More polluting
industries see long-run declines in productivity after an increase in the stringency of
environmental regulation.
It thus seems that the level of external competition in an industry is a key driving force inducing
firms to turn environmental constraints into their advantage. It seems to be a more important
factor than potential for efficiency gains from waste and emissions reduction. This could be
another line of argument in the debate about the effect of free trade on environment protection
(see for instance, Antweiler et al., 1998), indicating that free trade could be good for the
environment.
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